

The Conflict Between China and Taiwan During Xi's Era and Its Possible Solution

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Abstract

The conflict between China and Taiwan is a flash point and a significant geopolitical confrontation in the world. The unification of Taiwan is a crucial issue in Xi's China Dream. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine war, the unreasonable ambition of autocratic leaders and the fragile international order all indicate that Taiwan will be the next Ukraine. Although Xi emphasizes that Taiwan is part of China and is willing to take Taiwan by force if necessary, Taiwan insists that it is a de facto independent, democratic, and sovereign state. It significantly strengthens its military to defend the territory and prepare for war. Taiwan would likely be the essential root of World War III if all parties and roles could not find a way to resolve this conflict. By examining the conflict through the SPITCEROW model, the Conflict Spiral Model, and various conflict theories, including Identity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Security Dilemma, and Structural Violence Theory, and exploring the roles of gender and civil society on both sides, the conflict between China and Taiwan is found to be complicated, dangerous, and escalating. Without the intervention of third parties, the war in the Taiwan Strait seems inevitable. And third parties' Peace Enforcement could be the final method for resolving this conflict.

Keywords: SPITCEROW Model, Identity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, security dilemma, Structural Violence Theory, peace enforcement

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Peace Enforcement is a measure that a third party must apply when the conflict between two parties has fallen into the Conflict Spiral Model, in which two parties enter a vicious cycle and are unable to settle their disagreement peacefully. Through examining the conflict between Taiwan and China from the two sides' official claims, the role of civil society and gender issue, and applying the SPITCEROW model, Identity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Security Dilemma, and Structural Violence Theory, the conclusion is that this conflict has sunk into the Conflict Spiral Model, and are unable to settle their differences with each other. Hence, the conflict has to be intervened in by a third party. Eventually, the third party may need to employ Peace Enforcement, such as United Nations troops in the Gulf War and the NATO defense of Kosovo against a Serbian attack, as a final resolution to resolve the conflict between Taiwan and China.

I. Two Sides' Claims

From China's side, Xi Jinping's unification with Taiwan is decisive and unquestionable (Amonson, et al., 2023). Taiwan's official name is the Republic of China (ROC), which originated from the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After the KMT fled to Taiwan and established the regime in Taiwan, the CCP regime has constantly claimed that Taiwan belongs to China and that China will retake Taiwan. When Chinese President Xi took office, he shifted the focus of communism to nationalism, referring to it as the "China Dream" and "the Great Revival of the Chinese Nation." China Dream's essential content is the reunification of Taiwan. As Hartnett (2022) asserts, "pulling Taiwan back into the fold is a key element in Xi's China Dream promises. Making China great again is a recipe for swaggering unilateralism."

President Xi has made a clear statement, "We make no promise to renounce

the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means...Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China." (Sacks, 2021) Also, China's foreign minister said at the U.N. General Assembly, "Only when China is fully reunified can there be true peace across the Taiwan Strait...Take the most forceful steps to oppose external interference." (*Associated Press*, 2022)

Furthermore, China is also preparing positively to get the comprehensive capability to take Taiwan. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley said that China wants the capability to take Taiwan by 2027 (LaGrone, 2021), and CIA official David Cohen said that Xi has ordered the country's military to develop the ability to take control of Taiwan by 2027 (Saballa, 2022).

In Taiwan's position, Taiwan is a de facto independent sovereign state. Although ROC Taiwan is not a member of the U.N. due to the Cold War, it possesses many characteristics of a normal state, including a democratically elected government, an army, territory, population, and more than ten formal diplomatic allies. Since 1996, Taiwan has democratically elected its president and government in its territory, marking that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other (Lai, 2024).

In Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te's inauguration speech and 2024 National Day speech, he emphasized Taiwan's sovereignty. Taiwanese will resist annexation, and the two sides are not subordinate to each other. President Lai said, "On this land, democracy and freedom are growing and thriving. The People's Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan...I will also uphold the commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty." "The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other." (*Straits Times*, 2024) However, Lai also expressed hopes for dialogue with Beijing and extended an invitation to cooperate with China. He said, "I hope that China...choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over

containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by the Taiwanese people.” (Lai, 2024)

II. An Analysis by the Conflict Theories

In addition to the statements by the two sides, gaining insight into the conflict between China and Taiwan can be achieved through a thorough analysis and research using conflict theories, such as Identity Theory (Korostelina, 2007), Relative Deprivation Theory (Walker & Smith, 2002), Structural Violence Theory (Galtung, 1996), Security Dilemma (Booth & Wheeler 2008), and the SPITCEROW model (Mitchell, 1990). Meanwhile, in light of the current dynamic of the Taiwan Strait, gender and civil society are playing significant roles in the conflict between Taiwan and China; a thorough analysis of this conflict should not overlook these two factors and perspectives.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey that examined how people in Taiwan define their own identity, “While the Chinese government views Taiwan as a breakaway province, only 3% of people in Taiwan think of themselves as primarily Chinese. Nearly three-in-ten (28%) think of themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, but the largest share by far (67%) see themselves as primarily Taiwanese” (Huang & Starr, 2024). Indeed, two-thirds of adults in Taiwan identify themselves primarily as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese. Meanwhile, China views Taiwan as an integral part of its historical and cultural identity, and most Chinese think all Taiwanese are Chinese. So, as Identity Theory asserts, “Identity is not merely one of the many basic human needs; rather, it is a distinct category that underlies all conflicts.” (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013)

Since Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, China has established diplomatic relations with 10 of Taiwan’s former allies, including

Honduras, the Solomon Islands, and Panama, among others. This has caused these countries to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taiwan currently has 12 diplomatic allies, and this number is likely to continue declining. In addition, China prevents Taiwan from participating in all UN organizations, including the World Health Organization, and uses various repressive measures to prevent Taiwan from participating in international events. For example, at every Olympic Games, the Taiwanese team is only allowed to use the Chinese Taipei title and not the Republic of China flag. All of this makes Taiwan a very isolated international entity. The Relative Deprivation Theory posits that conflicts emerge when groups perceive themselves as being deprived of resources or opportunities compared to others (Walker & Smith, 2002). Taiwan feels deprived of international recognition and global communication by China, which leads to hostility and hatred of China increasing constantly. Additionally, due to U.S. export restrictions on semiconductor technology to China from Taiwan, the West often enhances Taiwan's international participation and status, leaving China feeling deprived of access to advanced technology and losing sovereignty and jurisdiction over Taiwan. As a result, the tension in the Taiwan Strait escalates.

The Structural Violence Theory also indicates that the political and economic pressures exerted by China on Taiwan, including diplomatic isolation and military threats, can be seen as forms of structural violence that contribute to the ongoing conflict (Galtung, 1996). Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, China has conducted many drills around Taiwan to provoke Taiwan and demonstrate its ability to invade Taiwan, and almost every day, PLA's fighter planes rashly cross the midline of the Taiwan Strait or enter Taiwan's ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone). In 2021, the PLA sent 150 fighter planes to invade the sky of Taiwan during China's National Day (Blanchard & Lee, 2021). In 2022, the Chinese military used six zones that effectively encircled Taiwan to conduct drills and sent missiles across the whole island from west to east during

a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to the island (Feng, 2022).

Additionally, Taiwan and China have already fallen into the Security Dilemma (Booth & Wheeler, 2008), which suggests that one state's efforts to enhance its security can be perceived as a threat by others, leading to an arms race and a potential escalation of conflict. China's military buildup is attracting worldwide attention and is almost surpassing that of the U.S. (Tirziu, 2024). Additionally, Taiwan's efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities with the help of the West are creating a security dilemma that heightens tensions.

The above four theories emphasize a specific aspect when analyzing the China-Taiwan conflict, such as identity, deprivation of rights and interests, structural violence threats, and security dilemmas. However, the SPITCEROW model analysis method differs from the above four theories, which focus on a specific point. The model provides conflict analysts with a broad perspective. It comprehensively analyzes the various elements of the China-Taiwan conflict, not only in terms of time but also in terms of space.

The SPITCEROW model is a well-known framework widely used to analyze the structures and dynamics of societal conflicts, developed by Christopher Mitchell (1990) in 1990, a British historian and Professor Emeritus at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University (Mitchell, 2025). Mitchell used the SPITCEROW acronym to represent the sources of the conflict, the parties involved, the issues at stake, the tactics employed, changes in the conflict, the expansion of the conflict, the roles the parties play, the outcomes of the conflict, and the winners of the conflict (Mitchell, 2000). From the SPITCEROW Model, we can analyze this conflict even further (See Table 1: SPITCEROW Model on the Conflict Between China and Taiwan).

S = Sources. The origins or source of this conflict are China's civil war in the 1940s, the China Dream, and the different institutions between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait.

P = Parties. CCP's PRC regime in China and the ROC regime in Taiwan.

I = Issues and Interests. PRC claims that Taiwan belongs to the PRC regime on the mainland. ROC in Taiwan claims that the two sides in the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other, and Taiwan is a de facto independent sovereign state.

T = Tactics. China: Military threats, infiltration, and United Front tactics inside Taiwan, coordinating military efforts with political negotiations, and promoting a political resolution to the Taiwan issue through military means. Taiwan: maintaining the Status Quo, strengthening military capabilities, and addressing the infiltration and United Front tactics employed by the CCP.

C = Changes. It has already become a new normal phenomenon that China's PLA crossed the middle line in the Taiwan Strait and the ADIZ. As Trump's Russia, Ukraine, and China policies change in his second term, tension in the Taiwan Strait escalates.

E = Enlargement. Recently, China cut off the submarine cables in the Strait and harassed some of Taiwan's outlying islands. The coast guards on both sides of the Strait have clashed many times and arrested many people from the other side. The conflict between the unification and independence factions in Taiwan has intensified in Congress and society.

R = Roles. Russia is China's ally. Japan and the Philippines are allies of Taiwan, and the U.S. is a weapons patron. In Trump's second term, the U.S. will likely act as an intermediary between China and Taiwan. The globe is the relevant audience.

O = Outcomes. This conflict is ongoing, and no outcome yet.

W = Winner. If China conquers and completely controls Taiwan, it will be a winner. If China renounces the unification of Taiwan, or the Taiwan Strait maintains the Status Quo in the future, Taiwan will be a winner. And if China becomes a democracy, China and Taiwan will solve the conflict peacefully, and both parties will be winners.

Table 1: SPITCEROW Model on the Conflict Between China and Taiwan

category	contents
sources (S)	Civil war, China Dream, and different institutions of the two parties
parties (P)	PRC in China and ROC in Taiwan
issues (I)	Whether Taiwan belongs to China
tactics (T)	China: Military Threat and United Front Work. Taiwan: strengthen and defend
changes (C)	Crossing the middle line and ADIZ becoming a new normal
enlargement (E)	Cut off submarine cables and harass outlying islands. Chaos in Taiwan
roles (R)	Russia is China's ally. Japan, the US, and the Philippines are Taiwan's allies.
outcomes (O)	Ongoing, and no outcome yet.
winner (W)	China will be a winner if it conquers Taiwan. Taiwan will be the winner if China loses.

According to the time and space sequence, these nine categories or variables are critical factors in any conflict. When we analyze a conflict event, these nine variables are indispensable. They form a complete picture and a whole, which helps us grasp the comprehensiveness and completeness of a conflict event.

III. Examining the Conflict from the Perspective of Gender and Civil Society

Currently, gender and civil society are the focus points for the international community, including academics, media, and ordinary people. Examining the role of gender and civil society on both sides is beneficial for understanding the conflict between China and Taiwan. Undoubtedly, China and Taiwan have significant differences on issues related to gender and civil society, which are crucial factors contributing to the conflict between China and Taiwan.

First, Taiwan is the first state in East Asia to announce the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the ruling party has a more progressive opinion on gender issues, including LGBT (Amnesty International, 2019). Every October, Taiwan hosts East Asia's largest pride parade for the LGBTQ+ community. President Lai Ching-te and former President Tsai Ing-Wen have attended the Pride Parade. "Taiwan's openness on LGBTQ+ issues stands in stark contrast to its giant neighbor, China, which claims Taiwan as its territory. While same-sex relations are not illegal in China, same-sex marriage is, and the Chinese government has been cracking down on LGBTQ+ activists and media" (*Deutsche Welle*, 2023). In the view of Chinese rulers and ordinary people, Taiwan's society is perceived as both liberal and corrupt. This escalated the conflict of the cultural gap between China and Taiwan and strengthened the legitimacy of the Chinese government's invasion of Taiwan.

Also, many of Taiwan's married wives come from China; they are called Chinese spouses or mainland spouses. Due to different political stances, the Chinese female spouses always post videos or threads on social media in Taiwan to insist that Taiwan belongs to China and that China should unite Taiwan by force. In 2025, three Chinese female spouses had their residency permits revoked over what immigration officials say is promoting unification with China by force. Taiwan's enforcement has deported at least two spouses (Hioe, 2025).

Chinese female spouses became the focal point during the conflict between China and Taiwan. They not only increased the peace in the Taiwan Strait but also escalated the tension between the two sides.

Civil society has a significant impact on resolving conflicts and promoting reconciliation. According to Belloni's *Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions*, the peaceful revolution of October 2000, which ended thirteen years of Milosevic's rule, was facilitated by a broad alliance among civil society actors, including nationalist and non-nationalist groups (Belloni, 2008). Additionally, the Christian Church and international civil rights organizations made considerable contributions to South Africa's end of racial Apartheid and the realization of racial conciliation (Turek, 2021). In Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church played a significant role in promoting Taiwan's democratization and addressing historical trauma during Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian rule.

Because the CCP dominates China's society, there is no civil society. However, the CCP exploited the political freedoms of Taiwan and the West, creating numerous groups and organizations to infiltrate and influence the civil societies of Taiwan and the West. For example, many parties and groups promote the unification of Taiwan and are supported by the CCP. They always hold many events to claim that Taiwan is part of China, and China should unify Taiwan and use force if necessary. Some parties and groups have been involved in criminal activities and have been prosecuted by the Taiwan government. This year, a couple affiliated with the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) was indicted for allegedly receiving US\$2.32 million from China to produce radio and digital media propaganda promoting the Chinese government's political agenda and influencing the outcome of Taiwan's elections (Lin & Pan, 2024). The CCP's United Front Work Department (UFW) has organized at least 40 Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Associations in the U.S., Europe, and globally to promote the unification of Taiwan, even by force if necessary, and to harass and suppress Taiwanese worldwide (National Committee

of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 2022).

Due to Taiwan's democracy, its civil society is very active. Many civil groups have a good relationship with China and support peaceful dialogue with China, whose stances are similar to that of the KMT, the second-largest political party in Taiwan, such as People First Party (Taiwan) (Chen, 2024), Grand Alliance for China's Reunification under the Three Principles of the People (*Taiwan Today*, 1982), and Taiwan's Labor Party (Roy, 2024), and so on. On the contrary, many civil groups oppose China's unification; they insist on Taiwan's independence or firmly resist China's invasion of Taiwan. For example, the 908 Taiwan Republic Campaign insists Taiwan is an independent state and doesn't belong to China or the regime of the ROC. It is not only against the KMT's platform of pro-unification with China, but also against the DPP's policy of maintaining the Status Quo (Lin & Pan, 2024).

IV. The Fundamental Nature of the Conflict and the Pessimistic Outlook

Through examining and analyzing the conflict between China and Taiwan using conflict theories, including Identity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Structural Violence Theory, Security Dilemma, and the SPITCEROW model, as well as the perspectives of gender and civil society, the conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a comprehensive, deep, and structural conflict. The two sides in this conflict would not automatically reach a peace agreement; instead, they are escalating the confrontation and struggle, falling into a vicious circle.

In this sense, regarding escalation models, since the two parties have already entered a vicious circle, the fundamental nature of the conflict in the Taiwan Strait applies to the Conflict Spiral Model (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962). Taiwan wants to get rid of China's control and expand its space for activities in the international community, but China regards it as Taiwan's delusion of

independence. So, China launched a new round of suppression. For example, Taiwan invited former US House Speaker Pelosi to visit Taiwan to enhance its international status. Still, China regarded it as a significant move for Taiwan's independence, which triggered large-scale military exercises around the island and threatened Taiwan with force (Haenle & Sher, 2022). To prevent China from invading Taiwan by force, Taiwan has been vigorously purchasing Western weapons. Still, China also saw this move as a manifestation of Taiwan's pursuit of independence, so it once again carried out military intimidation.

The current vicious cycle is manifested in the daily controversy over Taiwan's airspace and the arrest of each other's fishermen, stowaways, and spies. Taiwan has defined its airspace and the median line of the strait. Still, Chinese military aircraft deliberately violate Taiwan's airspace and the median line of the strait almost every day to show China's so-called sovereignty. In addition, when Taiwan captured Chinese spies in the military and civilian sectors in Taiwan, China soon captured some Taiwanese spies on the mainland (Davidson, 2025). When Taiwan captures some stowaways and illegal fishermen from China, China also quickly captures Taiwanese fishermen or cross-border people. The conflict between the two sides is escalating into a vicious cycle. Therefore, the solution to the conflict is pessimistic, and peace won't be reached if it depends only on the two sides themselves.

V. The Final Solution: Peace Enforcement from the Third Parties

Finally, what is the resolution of the conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and how can we prevent the escalation of tension and war between Taiwan and China? According to the comprehensive analysis above, the theory of the third party, along with the lessons of the Ukraine war, suggests that third parties must intervene in this conflict.

By analyzing the conflict through the SPITCEROW model and various conflict theories, including Identity Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Security Dilemma, and Structural Violence Theory, and examining the roles of gender and civil society on both sides, the conflict between China and Taiwan is found to be complex, perilous, and escalating. This also applies to the Conflict Spiral Model, as the two parties have already entered a vicious circle and are unable to settle their differences with each other. As a result, without the intervention of third parties, the war in the Taiwan Strait seems inevitable.

The theory of the third party is widely applied to resolve certain conflict cases. According to the book *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* by Pruitt and others (2004), a third party is an external entity that attempts to help two or more parties resolve their dispute: “Third party intervention is a growth industry. Every year, it seems that there are more types of third-party roles.” (Pruitt, et al., 2004). The book discusses ten distinct methods of third party intervention, including mediation, intermediation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and so on.

First, the third parties could employ the primary method, which is intermediation, and encourage dialogue between Taiwan and China. Due to Taiwan's consistent support for dialogue, China will not rule out peaceful unification, indicating that both parties have opportunities for peaceful dialogue and communication. Hence, the third party should promote communication and dialogue between Taiwan and China, and actively mediate during the dialogue. If the dialogue could lead to maintaining the status quo, or arms reduction, or the institutional arrangements that satisfy both parties, such as a Confederation or the Commonwealth of Independent States, the intermediation and dialogue could be successful, and the conflict could finally receive a solution. However, like the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, that between the two parties of the conflict promoted by the third party always failed. If the intermediation were inefficient, the third party could initiate the new approach: peace enforcement.

In *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, peace enforcement is defined as “Outside armed forces have also become involved in some conflicts as combatants, seeking to protect victims and right wrongs” (Pruitt, et al., 2004). Examples of peace enforcement include the Gulf War, in which United Nations troops (under the leadership of the United States) fought to liberate Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq, and the NATO defense of Kosovo against a Serbian attack (Pruitt, et al., 2004). Peace enforcement is a measure that a third party must apply when the conflict between two parties reaches a critical point that cannot be resolved peacefully.

If all intermediation by third parties failed and the Chinese military conducted a blockade of Taiwan, or China declared an intention to invade Taiwan, in those moments, Taiwan’s situation would be similar to Kuwait’s before the Gulf War; in such cases, the third party must apply peace enforcement to deter China’s aggression. And the third party not only strengthens the military power of Taiwan, as the West has constantly done so far, but also should send troops stationed on the island in advance to prevent the war, as the UN troops sent to Kuwait did.

The solution of peace enforcement by a third party was also a lesson from the Ukraine war. As we know, the West could not prevent the war in Ukraine because the economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and language warnings were inefficient. Like U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testified before the House Armed Services Committee: “Frankly, unless there is a commitment to send U.S. troops to the Ukrainian mainland, I’m not sure that Putin can be stopped” (Baldor & Burns, 2022). The only way to deter the Taiwan Strait war could be to inform China clearly that a powerful third party will undoubtedly fight directly against the invasion of Taiwan by China. Hence, the strategy of stationed troops could firmly express the third party’s determination.

Additionally, the approach of maintaining the Status Quo implemented by

Taiwan has been efficient in preventing the war so far. To permanently preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the third parties must keep the balance of power between the two sides. Peace through strength; only by upgrading Taiwan's strength, including enhancing weapons and stationing third-party troops, can it confront China and maintain the balance of power.

However, some experts, such as Eugene Rumer, assert that the involvement of multiple international actors could lead to heightened global tensions. Countries like Russia, as allies of China, may oppose the intervention, thereby increasing the risk of a broader geopolitical conflict (Rumer, 2024). Additionally, deploying third-party troops in Taiwan would directly lead to a war between the most extensive powers in the world, with enormous costs and massive devastation in East Asia (McCoy, 2023). Peace enforcement could incur additional costs, such as military expenses and sacrifices, and also affect the third party's domestic public opinion. Although the statements above are factual, Peace enforcement is a final measure that a third party has to apply when all peaceful methods have failed. To deter and sanction behaviors that violate international law and threaten global peace, peace enforcement must be employed. Furthermore, two cases of peace enforcement, Kuwait and Kosovo, have demonstrated efficiency and success. In this sense, the former U.S. President Biden has declared 5 times to deploy troops to Taiwan (Table 2)

Table 2: Biden has Declared to Deploy Troops to Taiwan

Date	Event and address	Media's Question	Biden's answer	White House response	Previous major events

Aug. 18, 2021	ABC NEWS Interview	You already see China telling Taiwan, "See? You can't count on the Americans.	We made a sacred commitme nt to Article 5 ...agains t our NATO allies, same with Taiwan.	The policy about Taiwan has not changed	Chaoti c U.S. withdr awal from Afgha nistan
Oct. 21, 2021	CNN Town Hall	Whether the U.S. would come to Taiwan's defense if China attacked	Yes, we have the commitme nt to do that	Not announcing any change in our policy	China Sent Nearl y 150 Aircra ft Near Taiwa n's Airspa ce aroun d Octob er 1, 2021
May 22, 2022	A joint press meeting, Tokyo.	Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?	Yes. That's the commitme nt we made.	As the President said, our policy has not changed.	After Russia invade d Ukrai ne on Febru ary 24, 2022

Sep. 19, 2022	CBS news show 60 Minutes	If U.S. forces would defend Taiwan	Yes, if, in fact, there was an unprecedented attack	Taiwan's policy hasn't changed.	After Russia invaded Ukraine
May 28, 2024	TIME	So, if I might, not ruling out the possibility of deploying US troops to Taiwan in the case of an invasion?	Not ruling out using US military force. There's a distinction between deploying on the ground, air power, and naval power, etc.		After the Hamas-Israel War

Essentially, who will be the third parties that implement the Peace Enforcement solution and send troops to Taiwan? During Biden's administration, the U.S. clearly expressed its determination to implement peace enforcement in the conflict between China and Taiwan as a third party. However, when Trump started his second term, the international situation was changing. Despite this, in addition to the U.S., the EU, NATO, parts of ASEAN, Japan, and the Philippines could also act as third parties. Japan, the Philippines, and some ASEAN states, such as Singapore and Vietnam, share common geopolitical interests with Taiwan. Western states aim to maintain the international order based on the rule. These states can work together to involve the Taiwan Straits as a third party in the conflict. As uncertainty increases regarding Trump's second-term policy towards Taiwan, the EU could become a

leader among third parties. That is why Taiwan is strengthening its relationship with the EU, as President Lai attended a reception commemorating the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day for the first time, and he attended the 2025 Europe Day Dinner remarkably (Office of the President, 2025). So, if the third parties send troops to Taiwan, they could use the name of the UN, but under the leadership of the EU, possibly.

V. Conclusion

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has drawn the world's attention to Taiwan. To realize his so-called Chinese dream, Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is likely to annex Taiwan by force. To prevent Taiwan from becoming the next Ukraine, the international community must coordinate and cooperate with Taiwan in advance to avoid the outbreak of a war in the Taiwan Strait. By drawing on various theories about conflicts and examining the facts and arguments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, I believe that the international community, as a third party, must intervene in the conflict between Taiwan and China. Moreover, while doing its best to promote dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, implementing the conflict resolution method of Peace Enforcement may be the final method to resolve the conflict in the face of escalating tension

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習近平時期的台海衝突及其可能解決方案

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摘 要

中台衝突是全球地緣政治的重大對抗和關注焦點。統一台灣是習近平「中國夢」的核心議題。烏克蘭戰爭爆發後，威權領導人的不合理野心和脆弱的國際秩序都預示着台灣將成為下一個烏克蘭。儘管習近平強調台灣是中國的一部分，如有必要會以武力奪取台灣，但台灣仍堅稱其為事實獨立的民主主權國家，並積極增強軍事實力以準備戰爭、保衛領土。如果衝突各方無法找到解決這場衝突的途徑，台灣很可能成為第三次世界大戰的根源。運用斯皮特羅模型、衝突螺旋模型以及一些衝突理論，例如身份認同理論、相對剝奪理論、安全困境和結構性暴力理論來審視這場衝突，並探討性別和公民社會在雙方角色中的作用，可以看出中台衝突複雜危險且不斷升級。如果沒有第三方介入，台海戰爭似乎不可避免。而第三方的強制和平或許是解決這一衝突的最終途徑。

關鍵詞：斯皮特羅模型、認同理論、相對剝奪理論、安全困境、結構性暴力理論、強制和平